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Distributional Welfare Impacts 
of Public Spending: The Case of 
Urban versus National Parks 
Eli Feinerman, Aliza Fleischer, and Avi Simhon 
This study examines the optimal allocation of funds between national and urban 
parks. Since travel costs to national parks are significantly higher than to urban 
parks, poor households tend to visit the latter more frequently,  whereas rich house- 
holds favor the former. Therefore, allocating public funds to improving the quality 
of  national parks at the expense of  urban parks disproportionately benefits high- 
income households. By  developing a theoretical model and implementing it using 
Israeli data, findings indicate all households, except for the richest decile, prefer that 
the park authority divert a larger proportion of  its budget from national to urban 
parks. 
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Introduction and Background 
Different income groups tend to consume different quantities of public goods. Therefore, 
funding the  provision of certain public goods may disproportionately benefit some income 
groups at the expense of others. The importance of  this issue with respect to outdoor 
recreation has been recognized by federal agencies in the United States, which have 
been directed to "identify differential patterns of consumption  of natural  resources among 
minority and low income populations" (U.S. Executive Order No. 12898,3  C.F.R. 859, 
1994). 
The purpose of this study is threefold: first, to develop a theoretical model in which 
different income groups tend to consume different quantities of public goods4ifferent 
types of parks in this paper; second, to analyze the welfare effects of budget allocation 
to the different park types; and third, using Israeli data, to assess empirically whether 
the different patterns of consumption of low- and high-income households are  taken into 
consideration in the  budgeting process. By achieving these goals, this analysis contrib- 
utes to the growing literature on "environmental justice" (for a recent survey, see Floyd 
and Johnson, 2002). 
Parks are public goods which in many countries are commonly maintained and 
preserved with public funds. Parks can be classified into two types: national or regional 
parks, and urban or local parks. The location of the parks obviously affects the  numbers 
of visitors they receive. In contrast to urban parks, national parks are usually located 
in the countryside, away from urban centers, making them expensive and sometimes 
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unaffordable for low-income, non-car-owning individuals [e.g., refer to the studies by 
Cordell et al. (1990) relating to the United States;  The Countryside Agency (2000) 
relating  to England; and Fleischer (1994)  relating to Israel.].  On the  other hand, national 
parks are also typically larger, serve a larger population, and retain more natural char- 
acteristics than urban parks. Moreover, national parks may offer the added benefit of 
providing enjoyment merely through the traveling experience itself (Hanink and  White, 
1999), and may also be more attractive because their relative inaccessibility suggests 
less congestion (Mealey, 1988). 
The literature on recreational sites is replete with studies addressing consumers' 
choices among a discrete number of heterogeneous sites (see, e.g., Kaoru, Smith, and Liu, 
1995;  Kling, 1988;  Haab and Mccomell, 1996;  Phaneuf, 1999;  Feather and Shaw, 1999). 
A few studies have examined the relationship between outdoor recreation habits and 
income. Suggesting a method of measuring the  equity consequences of public programs, 
Kalter and Stevens (1971)  found that  the  net benefits per household from the Stonewall 
Jackson Water Reservoir project in West Virginia were higher for high-income house- 
holds compared to low- and medium-income households. Hill and Alterman (1979) 
studied the equity of the allocation of land for public services. They concluded "weakn 
communities are  also relatively deprived in the allocation of open spaces for playgrounds 
and gardens. A study  by Reiling, Cheng, and Trott (1992)  reports a qualified discrimina- 
tory impact of Maine state park entrance fees on low-income users. 
Given that urban and national parks are unevenly used by different income classes, 
the distribution of public funding between the two types of parks may reflect a possible 
preferential treatment of certain income groups over others. To detect the  possibility of 
preferential treatment, we propose in this study a theoretical framework to examine the 
welfare effects of the  budget allocation between urban and  national parks. The empirical 
findings agree  with the  predictions of our theoretical model that  high-income  households 
visit national parks more frequently than urban parks, whereas the opposite holds true 
for low-income  households. We use a comprehensive data  set on funding  and the  number 
of visits to parks in Israel to calibrate our model and evaluate the optimal distribution 
of funds. Findings show that  not only does the distribution of funds across the two types 
of parks not favor low-income  households, it  may even reflect (perhaps unintentionally) 
a bias toward high-income households. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, the theoretical framework 
is developed for the households' problem, proving that visits to urban parks are an 
inferior good while visits to national parks are a normal good. In addition, we derive the 
necessary conditions for the optimal budget allocation of a benevolent park authority. 
The validity of our theoretical predictions is  then tested, and the model parameters are 
calibrated. In the next section, the optimal budget allocation  between national and urban 
parks is determined. The hal  section presents some conclusions and possible extensions 
for future research. 
The Model 
Households 
Households derive utility from recreational activities and all other goods. Recreational 
activities comprise three different types: visits to urban parks and to national parks (C, 
and C,, respectively),  measured by the annual number of visits, and all other recreational 372  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
activities (R),  measured in nominal annual spending. In addition, households derive 
utility from consumption of  a composite good (Z),  also measured in nominal annual 
spending. 
For preferences, we choose a widely used utility function (e.g., Prescott, 1986; Romer, 
2001, p. 206): 
(1)  U  = aln(1  + C,)  + Pln(1 + C2)  + y ln(R) + ln(Z), 
where a, p, and y and are some positive parameters.1  Note that (1)  implies visits to parks 
are  not essential goods, whereas some forms of  other recreation and consumption of the 
composite goods are. 
Households maximize utility subject to the budget constraint. While visits to urban 
parks are free, visits to national parks involve a travel cost ofp per visit.'  Thus, every 
household faces the budget constraint: 
where I  is the household's annual income. 
A central feature of recreational activities  is that they are  time-consuming, and differ- 
ent types of  recreational activities vary in the time they require. Hence, the following 
time constraint is added: 
Visit time in urban parks is normalized to one, hereafter a standard visit time (a day),3 
t is the standard visit time required for one visit in a national park, e is the standard 
visit time required for one dollar's worth of  other recreational a~tivities,~  and T is the 
standard visit time available over a year for all types of  recreation. The assumption that 
T is fmed and individuals cannot trade income and leisure is equivalent to restricting 
individuals to work a predetermined number of hours. The assumption of  labor indivisi- 
bility has become standard in the labor and macroeconomics literature (e.g., Hansen, 
1985;  Diamond and Mirrlees, 1986;  Prescott, 1986;  Hamilton, 1988;  Christian0 and 
Eichenbaum, 1992; Mulligan, 1998).  Empirical studies strongly suggest firms restrict 
their employees' labor supply. Hours of  work are heavily influenced by the particular 
job a person holds, and hour changes within jobs are typically very limited (e.g., Altonji 
and Paxson, 1986; Biddle and Zarkin, 1989). 
Finally, we follow the literature by assuming households' utility from visiting parks 
increases with public funding to these parks (Taylor, 1999),  based on the notion that 
investment improves the quality of the parks, thereby increasing the pleasure from each 
visit. Specifically,  we assume: 
P1 
a = slgl  and  P  = sZgF, 
The parameter multiplying h(Z)  is normalized to 1. 
Assuming C, is costly although cheaper than C,  would not affect our results, but would add more notation. 
A visit to an urban park does not necessarily take a whole day; however, we assume that on a day when the household 
visits a park it will not consume other recreational activities. 
Conceivably, wealthier people engage in other recreational activities that are more expensive relative to poorer house- 
holds, implying they use less time spending one dollar. Hence, e decreases with income. For simplicity, and since we do not 
have information on the relationship between I and e,  the latter is assumed to be constant. Feinerman, Fleischer, and Simhon  Distributional Welfare of Parks  373 
where g, and g, are public spending in urban and national parks, respectively, and s,, 
s,, p,,  and p,  are some exogenous parameters, reflecting the technology of converting 
funding into park quality. Intuitively, p,  and p,  would be expected to be smaller than 
one to reflect decreasing marginal returns to park funding. Indeed, this intuition is 
confirmed by the estimations reported in the empirical analysis section. It should be 
emphasized that while households take a and P as given, the park authority affects 
them by determining g, and g,. 
Analysis of  the Household$ Problem 
Every household maximizes (1)  subject to (2)  and (3), taking a and P as  given. The first- 
order conditions are expressed as: 
a 
sp  (with equality if C, > O), 
1  + C, 
(5b)  -  < pA  + tp  (with equality if C,  > O), 
1  + C, 
(5c)  ylR  = qA  + ep, 
and equations (2)  and (31, where A and pare  the Lagrangian multipliers associated with 
equations (2) and (3), respectively. 
Recall, by equation (I),  visiting parks is not an essential good. To ensure households 
have enough time to induce them to visit at  least one park, it  is assumed T is  sufficiently 
large. Specifically, we assume: 
(6)  T > epyl(qp - qta +pea)  > 0. 
The following lemma proves that if T satisfies (6),  then every household visits at  least 
one type of park. 
LEMMA  1. If T > epyl(qp - qta +pea),  then either C, > 0, or C,  > 0, or both. 
Proof: Suppose not. Then C,  = C,  = 0, which by (5a), (5b),  and (3)  implies a s p, 
p 2  p A + tp, and R = Tle. Substituting into (5c) and rearranging, we find that 
T s ep  yl(qp -  qta+pea),  in contradiction to equation (6),  thus proving lemma 1. 
The threshold level of  T is proportional to y because visiting parks and other types 
of recreation come one at  the expense of the other, and the more desirable is R, the less 
time is allocated to visiting parks. It is assumed throughout the paper that (6) is 
maintained. Later on, it is shown that the calibrated parameters are well within the 
boundaries defined by (6). 
As shown by lemma 2, given our assumption that all households visit parks, 
transportation costs may deter poor households from visiting national parks, and they 
consequently visit only urban parks. Specifically, we show there is a threshold level of 
income, I,, below which households do not visit national parks at  all. 374  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
LEMMA  2.  There is a critical income level,  I,, such that households with income 
I  _< I, choose C,  = 0. 
Proof: The proof is in the appendix. 
We also find that urban parks are an  inferior good, whereas national parks are a 
normal good. Specifically, the  richer the  household, the  less it  visits urban parks and the 
more it visits national parks. 
PROPOSITION  1. For I, c I, C, strictly declines and C, strictly increases with I. 
Proof: The proof is in the appendix. 
Proposition 1  reveals an important pattern in visiting parks: the poorer the house- 
hold, the more frequently it  visits urban parks, and the richer the household, the more 
it visits national parks. The intuition underlying this pattern is that poor households 
can afford to spend only small amounts of money on traveling to national parks (which 
are located far away) and on other recreation. This leaves them more time to visit the 
low-cost, urban parks, and therefore C, is relatively large and the  marginal utility from 
another visit to a local park is low. As households get richer, they can afford to spend 
more on C,  and R where the marginal utility is high. Consequently, the higher the 
household's income, the greater  the  shadow price of its  time.5  Hence, high-income house- 
holds cut down on the cost-free recreation with the low marginal utility and switch to 
the other, more expensive forms of recreation where the marginal utility is greater. In 
other words, as  households become richer, the time constraint becomes more pressing 
relative to the budget constraint. 
Welfare and Policy 
Public spending affects welfare by affecting the quality of parks, and consequently the 
level of enjoyment per visit and the number of visits. Investment in the various types 
of parks also has distributional effects because, as  shown in proposition 1,  poor house- 
holds visit more urban parks whereas the richer households are  biased toward national 
parks. Therefore, the allocation of public funds between urban and national parks 
reflects the relative importance the authorities attribute to the welfare of the poor. In 
Israel, for example, where our data  originate, the policy of the  park authority is to favor 
funding parks used more extensively by low-income households. 
Our goal is to examine whether the composition of the actual public investment in 
parks is consistent with this policy. As a benchmark, the optimal distribution of public 
investment in  the  two types of parks is  calculated assuming  a Bergson-Samuelson social 
welfare function with equal weights. That is, given the aggregate public spending on 
parks, G, we calculate what should have been its composition if the authorities had 
assigned equal weights to the welfare of all the households in the economy. Then the 
actual public funding is compared to the benchmark results and to the allocations pre- 
ferred by the various income deciles. 
'  Usually, the shadow price of time is related to income through the wage rate. This is not the case here, since we regard 
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For the theoretical derivation of  the optimal budget allocation, it is useful to 
distinguish between households whose income exceeds I, (see  lemma 2) and those whose 
income is lower than I,.  The optimal values for the former group are denoted by a single 
superscript asterisk, and for the latter group by superscript double asterisks, respec- 
tively. Let G = n,g, + n,g,  be the predetermined aggregate spending on parks, where 
n,, g,, n,, andg, are the number of urban parks, the actual public spending per urban 
park, the number of national parks, and the actual public spending per national park, 
respectively. Using (2),  (3),  (4),  and (5a)-(5d),  and substitutingg, = (G - n,g,)ln,,  yields: 
C;*  = C;*(I, g,, k), C;  = C;(I, g,, k), and C,'  = C,*(I,  g,, k),  where k is avector ofexogen- 
ous parameters. Then: 
(a)  By lemma 2, for a representative household with I  s I,(g,), Cr  = 0, and U**  = 
u**(C~*(I,  g,, k), I,  g,, k). By the Envelope Theorem, 
du**  - au**  du**  - au**  and  ---. 
dg,  ag,  d~  ar 
(b)  Similarly, for a representative household with I  > I,(g,), U*  = u*(C;(I, g,, 
k), Ci(I,  g,, k),  I,  g,, k). By the Envelope Theorem, 
du*  - au*  du*  - au*  and  ---a 
dg,  ag,  ar 
As noted above, our goal is to examine whether the composition of  the actual public 
investment in parks is consistent with the aforementioned official policy of  the park 
authority to favor funding parks which are used more extensively by low-income house- 
holds. As a benchmark, the optimal distribution of public investment in the two parks 
is calculated, assuming  a Bergeson-Samuelson  social welfare function  with equal  weights, 
given the aggregate public spending. Formally, the benchmark social optimization prob- 
lem is specified as: 
where f (I)  is the probability density function of  income. 
Assuming an interior solution and utilizing Leibnitz's theorem for derivatives of the 
integral yield the necessary condition for an optimum: 
-  au* 
+ Llkl) f (I)  d'  = 0. 376  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Note that at the threshold income level I =I,, C;(I,, g,, k) = C:(I,,  g,, k), and C,'(I,, g,, 
k) = Cdt(I1,  g,, k) = 0, implying U*(Cl(I,,  g,, k),  0, I,,  g,, k) = U**(Cf*(l,,  g,, k),  I,, g,, k). 
Thus, the first-order condition reduces to: 
~,(g,)  au**  au*  J  Id  +  -f(I)dI  =o. 
agl  II(~,)  agl 
Let g; denote the value of g, that solves (8), and g,' = (G - n,g;)ln,.  Thus, g; and g,' are 
the per urban and per national park investment, respectively, that maximize W(g,). 
Since households with income smaller than I, visit only urban parks, an increase of 
g, (at the expense of g,) can easily be shown to increase U**  (aU**/ag,  > 0). Hence, it 
follows from (8) that at  the optimum, aU*/ag, < 0. Namely, increasing the budget share 
allocated to local parks leads to a tradeoff between the  welfare of low-income  households 
(with I  < I,)  and  high-income households. Shifting  one dollar from national to local parks 
raises the welfare of  low-income households, who prefer local parks, and lowers the 
welfare of high-income households, who prefer national parks. At the margin, the gains 
of the first group and the losses of the second are balanced. 
In the following section, we calibrate our model to find the optimal composition, gf  , 
g,*  that solves (81, given G. Then gi and g,' are compared to the actual public spending 
to assess whether the actual funding of parks is consistent with the stated policy of giving 
preference to low-income households. The finest available data on income distribution 
are given by deciles. Hence, in the actual calibration, the integral in (8) is replaced by 
summation over income deciles. 
Empirical Analysis 
An empirical analysis of the model is conducted starting with a brief description of the 
data. About 90% of the parks, urban and national, in Israel, have been planted within 
the last hundred years as part of  a massive forestation effort. Israel has about 56 
national parks, most of them located in peripheral regions. Although Israel is a small 
country, most of these parks are a one- to three-hour drive from the main population 
centers. Urban parks were planted at the fringe but still within city limits. They are 
smaller than national parks, and total 62 in number. 
Most of  the data for this analysis are taken from Hope and Fleischer (1998), and 
Fleischer (1994).  Hope and Fleischer conducted a comprehensive survey of recreational 
preferences and actual participation in recreational activities of the adult (over the age 
of 18)  Israeli population. Every other month, from October 1997  to August 1998, a sample 
of 400-500  respondents were asked about their recreational activities in the preceding 
two months. The survey was administered by telephone using a random-digit dialing 
procedure, providing a new sample each time. A total of 2,987 individuals were surveyed. 
After deleting ineligible numbers, the response rate  to the survey was 78% (2,330 
respondents). Repeating the survey every two months for a year enabled the avoidance 
of two potential problems. One is the problem of respondents not remembering all their 
recreational activities over the space of a year, and the other is the problem of season- 
ality. Table 1  presents a description of the variables and summary statistics based on 
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Table 1. Variable Description and Summary Statistics:  Survey of Recreational 
Preferences and Activities of Israeli Adult Population (N  = 2,330) 
Standard 
Variable Name and Description  Mean  Deviation 
Number of Visits to Urban Parks 
Number of Visits to National Parks 
Education 
1  = elementary  3 = vocational or partial college 
2 = high school  4 = university degree(s) 
Age  3.34  1.76 
1  = 18  to 20 years  5 = 50 to 59 years 
2 = 21 to 29 years  6 = 60 to 69 years 
3 = 30 to 39 years  7 = 70+ years 
4 = 40 to 49 years 
Family Size (number of persons in household)  3.94  1.70 
Religious (= 1  if respondents declare themselves observant, = 0 otherwise)  0.35  0.47 
Source: Hope and Fleischer, 1998. 
Fleischer (1994) conducted a survey regarding the visiting habits of  the Israeli 
population to urban and national parks. The data were collected through a survey of 
in-person interviews of  1,143 respondents at their homes. The respondents received a 
list of  23 most popular parks in Israel and a map of their locations (11  urban parks and 
12 national parks). They were asked to indicate whether they had visited any of  these 
parks in the preceding year and if so, how many times. 
Empirical Test and Theory 
The preferences represented by  equation (I), coupled with the budget and time con- 
straints of  equations (2) and (3),  respectively, are simple but rich enough to capture the 
fundamental relationships between income and visits to urban and national parks. In 
this subsection, Hope and Fleischer's (1998)  data are used to empirically test our main 
theoretical finding-namely  that visits to urban parks are an inferior good while visits 
to national parks are a normal good. In the absence of  data on the personal incomes of 
park visitors, level of  education is used as a proxy for inc~me.~ 
Due to the censored nature of  the data-i.e.,  respondents who had not visited parks 
within the prior two months reported zero visits-the  Tobit model is used. Beginning 
with the most parsimonious specification, education is found to be positively and 
significantly  correlated  with the number of visits to national parks, and to be negatively, 
although insignificantly, correlated with visits to urban parks (see model 1, table 2). 
While for the sake of  simplicity the focus of  our theoretical model is on the relation 
between income and visits to parks, there are clearly other household characteristics 
which affect the number of  visits. These include the age of  the respondents, their 
number of  children, and whether they drive on the Sabbath. Once these factors are 
Because Hope andFleischer (1998)  expected their respondents might be reluctant to accurately reveal their income level, 
respondents were asked only to report their level of  education, which is highly correlated with income (see Flug and Kasir, 
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Table 2. Tobit Model Estimates for the Number of Visits to Parks 
[dependent variable = Number of  Visits to Urban (National)  Parks1 
Variable " 
Urban Parks  National Parks 






Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at  the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are asymmetric t-values. 
" For description of variables, refer to table 1. 
taken into account (model 2, table 2), the results concur with our theoretical predic- 
tions-i.e.,  the  number of visits to urban parks decreases (at  the 10%  significance level) 
and the number of visits to national parks increases, with level of education. 
Calibration of the Model Parameters 
Before proceeding with calibration of the model to match the data, p, and p,  are 
estimated. For this purpose, data  are  taken from Fleischer (1994),  who surveyed visiting 
habits and the funding of 11 urban parks and 12 national parks in Israel. We begin by 
estimating p,, and assume every household visits only one park of each type.7  By (4) and 
(5a), for each household i that visits an urban park  j, 
where gjis investment in park j. Summing over all the households that visit park j 
yields: 
where nj  is the number of households visiting park  j. Next, the income distribution of 
households visiting urban parks is assumed to be the same across parks of  this type. 
Therefore, 
To  estimate p,,  we evaluate the marginal utility of each household from visiting urban parks. However, if a household 
visits several different urban parks, its marginal utility is determined by the total number of visits to all of them. Although 
it is apparent from Fleischer (1994)  that each household tends to visit a single urban park, this is not always the case. There- 
fore, wherever a household visits more than one park, we attribute its total number of visits to urban parks to the one it 
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where A is the same for all urban parks. Taking the natural logarithm of  both sides of 
this equation yields: 
where a = ln(s,A). Having the data on 
and ong: for every park  j in the survey, using least squares we estimate p,  = 0.158 (with 
t-ratio = 3.46). Similarly, we estimate p,  = 0.163 (with t-ratio = 3.86) by substituting 
p = sZg,P2  into (5b). 
The parameter values t = 1.25 andp = 80 were calculated based upon the average 
distance households travel to national parks and the travel cost. The value of  T is 
determined from the number of  days in the year less the average number of  working 
days in Israel. Last, we take into account the fact that religious Jews cannot leave their 
immediate neighborhood during religious holidays or on Saturdays. Following these 
considerations, T is approximated to equal 143. 
Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (2000)  provides data on households' other recrea- 
tional expenditures, Ri,  for every income decile i. Given the average  R (averaged over 
income deciles), e is calculated using (3):' 
Finally, the average expenditures on Z are calculated using (2): 
We are now in a position to calibrate the parameters of  the utility function, a, P, and y. 
This is done for the "average" household, i.e., the household with the observed average 
values of C,, C,, R, and Z, and average income I.  Then these averages and the calculated 
prices e, t, andp are substituted into the first-order conditions, (5a)-(5d).  This results 
in four equations with five variables (a, P, y, y,  and A), leaving one undetermined 
variable. 
The undetermined variable allows us to calibrate the model for a range of values. The 
range of  a, p, and y is limited by the observation that all the income deciles spend a 
smaller proportion of  their income on recreational activities than on Z (between 7% and 
12%).  Since the prices of  R and Z are the same, y must not exceed 1. Thus, the "extra 
equation" and the conjecture that y  2 1  are used to analyze the model over the whole 
range of  plausible parameters. Specifically,  we set P and calculate the values of  & and 0 
that solve the first-order conditions (5a)-(5d), given the average values of  C,, C,, R, Z, 
and I,  where the hat (") denotes calibrated values. Then &,  0,  and P are substituted into 
the first-order conditions (2),  (3),  and (5a)-(5d),  to calculate the allocation generated by 
Recall from footnote 4 that due to lack of information on the (negative) relationship between I and e,  we calculate e for 
the average consumer and assume it to be the same for all income deciles. However, in the calculation  of the optimal budget 
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Table 3. Calibrated and Actual Values for a Range of y 
Model-Generated Means  Data Means 
Y  S^1  32  Cl  c2  R  Cl  c2  R 
the model, el,, e,,, Ri,  zi,  for every income decile, i = 1,2, ..., 10. This procedure is re- 
peatedfor y = I0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0). 
The last parameters to be calibrated are  .3,  and .3,.  For each triplet &,  D,  and P, these 
parameters are calculated using (4): 
S;  = &gl-P1  and  i2  = pgip2, 
whereg, = 0.3 andg, = 1.2 million new Israeli shekels (henceforth, NIS), the actual 1997 
average funding for the two park types.g 
Table 3 reports the averages of  el,  e,, and R that are generated by the model for 
different levels of y and compares them to the observed values. The second and third 
columns report the calibrated values of s, and s, for each y. It should be noted that for 
all values of y,  T is well within the boundaries defined by equation (6). 
Interestingly, both 3, and .3,  increase with y, implying by (4) that a and P likewise 
increase with y. The intuition underlying co-movement of a, P, and y is that increasing 
y raises the marginal utility of R, which must be compensated by a rise in a and P. 
Otherwise, because of the time constraint,  R would increase at  the expense of C, and C, 
which would decline below their observed values. And yet, although a, P, and y increase 
jointly, a rise in y lowers C,. The intuition underlying the decline in C, is the following. 
Since a, p, and y increase  jointly, a rise in y lowers the utility of Z relative to the utility 
from the recreational activities. However, recreational activities are time-consuming 
while other consumption is not, implying a rise in y raises the value of time (p)  relative 
to the value of  money (A).  On the other hand, the time constraint is always binding, 
suggesting C,, C,,  and R cannot all change in the same direction. At the same time, the 
decline in the  utility from Z reduces the expenditures on purchasing it, thereby freeing 
resources for buying the costly recreational activities C,  and R, at the expense of the 
cheaper C,. 
While the data contain only the average of C, and C,,  our model generates a predic- 
tion for the number of visits for every income decile. Figures 1  and 2 graph the number 
ofvisits to urban parks and to national parks, respectively, by decile for the  case y = 0.5. 
The figures illustrate the main theoretical finding of this study: poor households visit 
urban parks more frequently than rich households, while rich households visit national 
parks more frequently than poor households. 
It  should be emphasized that the estimatedvalues of  it  and pare used here to calculate 8, and 8,. In the calculation of the 
optimal budget allocation in the following section, a and P  are not held constant; given $  and $,  they vary with g, and g, 
according  to (4). Feinerman, Fleischer, and Simhon  Distributional Welfare of Parks  38 1 
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Optimal Budget Allocation 
Given all the calibrated parameters of the  model, we are  now in a position to achieve the 
main empirical goal of  this analysis-to  evaluate the optimal budget allocation by 
findingg; andg,' that solve the optimization problem (7). This is done by simulating the 
economy for the whole range of g, and g, that satisfies n,g,  + n,g,  = G, where G is the 
actual 1997 aggregate funding for both types of parks. The optimal budget allocations 
for the various values of y are as follows: 
In  the surveyed year of  1997,  the park authority allocated an  average 0.3 million NIS 
(about $100,000) per urban park and 1.2 million NIS per national park. As  observed 
from the above table, the optimal share for urban parks is between 36% (y = 0.25) and 
43% (y = 1)  greater than its actual share.'' 
Furthermore, because poorer households prefer urban parks and richer households 
prefer national parks, the gap between the actual and preferred allocation is larger the 
lower the household's income. Figure 3 illustrates this point: for each of the first, fifth, 
and tenth income deciles, we graph the difference between its utility level as a function 
ofg, and its  utility at  the actual allocation.ll At low levels ofg,, all the households prefer 
spending a greater proportion of the park authority's budget on local parks. Hence, all the 
graph lines in figure 3 are at  first negative and increasing. By construction, all the graphs 
reach the zero point at  the actual spending level,g, = 0.3, from which point the graphs of 
the first and fifth deciles continue to increase, while the graph of the tenth decile starts 
declining. The graph of the first income decile reaches its  maximum atg, = 0.58, implying 
its utility is maximized at almost twice the actual spending on urban parks. The utility 
level of middle-income households (decile 5) reaches its maximum at  g, = 0.34, indicating 
these households prefer a moderate increase of  13%,  while households in the highest 
income decile prefer the current allocation. Therefore, we conclude that except for the 
highest decile, all the households prefer the park authority to allocate a larger propor- 
tion of its budget to urban parks at  the expense of national parks. 
Concluding Remarks 
Providers of public goods, such as park authorities, often see it as one of their goals to 
favor the  welfare of low-income  households. In making budget-allocation decisions, park 
authorities may exploit the  difference in consumption patterns of park services between 
lo Admittedly, our analysis does not take into consideration non-use values (option, bequest, existence, etc.), which could 
serve to justify government overspending on national parks. 
"In  the previous section, an  "average household" over an  "average year" between 1994 and  2000 was used to calibrate the 
model parameters. In other words, having calculated k allows us to numerically evaluate for every income decile i the equi- 
librium utility levels, U"(C;'(I, g,,  k),  I,,  g,, k),  and U'(C;(I,,  g,, k),  C;(I,,  g,, k),  I,,  g,, k)  as  a function ofg,. In  figure 3, we 
graph U"(C;'(I,,g,, k),  I,,g,,  k)  - U"(Cf (I,,  0.3, k),  I;,  0.3, k)  and U*(C;(I,,g,,  k), C;(I,,g,,  k),  I;,  g,, k)  - U*(C;(Ii,  0.3, k), 
C,'(I,,  0.3, k),  I,,  0.3, k)  as a function of g, . Feinerman, Fleischer, and Simhon  Distributional Welfare of Parks  383 
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Figure 3. Difference in utility for income deciles 1,5, and 10 
low-and high-income households in order to compensate for social deprivation. Our 
findings confirm that visits to national parks increase with income, while the number of 
visits to urban parks declines with income. Therefore, equity can be increased by 
allocating a larger share of  a limited budget to the development of  urban parks at the 
expense of national parks. 
In the Israeli case considered here, the budget allocated to national parks is found to 
be greater than the optimal. Specifically, except for the highest income decile, all the 
households in the economy would have preferred the share devoted to urban parks 
exceed the amount actually allocated. The existing bias toward the overprovision of 
resources to national parks at the expense of urban parks reveals that, in actuality, not 
only do the actions of the park authority not favor the welfare of the poor, there is a bias 
favoring the parks which are more frequently visited by the rich. We believe the major 
reason for the current budget allocation stems from a failure by the authorities to take 
into account that the level of income affects the frequency of visits to parks. 
Assessing the equity implication of public policy requires disaggregated welfare 
analysis-namely,  estimating the differential implications for the various segments of 
society. By segments of society, we also refer to differences in individual characteristics 
other than income. The method developed in this analysis is relevant to many settings 
in which equity is an  important criterion for policy evaluation, such as  recreational sites, 
environmental quality (e.g., clean water bodies), and the adverse effect of noxious facili- 
ties (e.g., landfills, power stations). These sites are  located at  different distances from the 
communities they serve, and the cost of using them depends on location. Thus, the 
demand for public goods is income-dependent, and the public funds allocated to these 
goods have social and equity consequences. Determining the optimal location of such 
sites, taking into account the spatial distribution of households' residence and income, 
is another direction in  which our analysis can be profitably extended through future 
research. 
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Appendix: 
Proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 
Proof of Lemma 2 
The household is indifferent between visiting and not visiting national parks if and only if  P =pa  + tp. 
By lemma 2, since C, =0,  it must be that C,  > 0,  implying al(1  + C,) = p.  Substituting P  =pa  + tp, 
al(1  + C,) = p, and C,  + eR = T into ylR = ql  + ep  and rearranging yields: 
R  =  (T  + 1 - eR)py 
qp(T + 1 - eR)  - qta +pea 
Next, we show there exists 0 < R* < Tle  that solves the above equation. To prove this, note that both 
sides of  the equation are continuous. Furthermore, the right-hand side (RHS)  of  the equation satisfies 
RHS(R  = 0)  =  (T  + l)py 
qP(T + 1) - qta +pea  > 0, 
where the inequality follows from text equation (6).  In addition, 
RHS(R  = Tle)  =  < Tle, 
qP  - qta +pea 
where the inequality follows from (6).  Hence, by the Mean Value Theorem, there exists 0 < R* < Tle 
such that 
R*  =  (T  + 1 - eR*)py 
qp(T  + 1 - eR') - qta +pea 
The existence of  such R* proves that there exists I, for which households choose C, = 0 and are indif- 
ferent to visiting or not visiting a national park. 
To see that R* is unique, note 
a2RHS -  --  -e2pyqpa(pe -  qt) 
a~2  [qp(T  + 1 - eR) - qta + peal2 
is either positive or negative depending on the parameters. However, whether positive or negative, it 
does not change signs. 
Finally, if Z  <I,, then P  <pa  + tp,  which implies C, = 0,  completing the proof of  lemma 2. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Suppose that I, < I. Then, by lemma 2, C,  > 0,  and it follows that whenever C,  > 0,  there is an interior 
solution. We  begin by using text equations (2)  and (3)  to eliminate C, and R from (1): 
Deriving U with respect to C, and Z yields: 386  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Next, we follow the standard technique of differentiating Ucl  = 0 and U, = 0 with respect to I  and solving 
for aC,laI (e.g., Varian, 1984, pp. 134-135). We find 
where U,, is the derivative of  U with respect to x  and y. Straightforward derivation of the numerator 
reveals 
On the other hand, the second-order conditions for a maximum ensure the denominator is positive. 
Hence, aC,laI < 0. 
Employing the same technique, text equations (2) and (3) are used to eliminate C, and R from (1). 
Deriving U with respect to C,  and Z  and solving for aC,/aI, we find 
ac,  -  Uc,uz1  - ~zz~c2~ 
-- 
dl  Uc2c2Uzz  - Uc,zUzc2 
The second-order conditions for a maximum ensure the denominator is positive. Straightforward 
derivation of the numerator reveals 
Hence, aC,laI > 0, completing the proof of proposition 1. 